Pianporn Deetes
Southeast Asia Rivers Network

For the past two years locals along the banks of the Mekong River in Chiang Khong District of Chiang Rai, Thailand have experienced the most extreme and adverse river changes in memory. During the rainy seasons of 2002 and 2003, four households living in Pak Ing village lost an entire bank of land to the river because of the unnaturally turbulent flow of the river. More seriously, on the opposite bank at Baan Don Sawan, a community in Laos, land and homes for 113 families were swept away with the flow.

“I have no idea if my house will still be here next year,” said Mr. Boonkong whose land is on the edge of the riverbank near where his neighbor’s houses slid into the river due to bank erosion. “I hope our family won’t be the next one,” he said in a worrying tone. It is not difficult to foretell the future if one stands on the bank looking upstream at the rapid flow of the river.

For these villagers, the Mekong has drastically changed only recently. Velocity, sedimentation levels, and most acutely, water fluctuations have caused great ecological damage and deterioration. These impacts have directly contributed to the difficulties of those whose way of life is dependent upon the river for fishing, riverbank cultivation, water supply, and shelter.

China’s Unacceptable Scheme

The culprit of these drastic changes is a Chinese-led navigation channel improvement project along the Mekong. The Chinese scheme entails the installation of a series of 8 dams cascading down the Mekong River. The Manwan dam is already in place and has changed the course of the river and the five downstream nations that share its borders. The series of planned dams would control the flow of the river and with the help of rapid blasting; enable the passage of large transport and cargo ships. Besides boosting business for the transport business the dams would also create a large amount of energy for Chinese use. However, China has been insistent that the dams are a benefit to all by controlling downstream flooding.

However, according to a year of in-depth research by SEARIN and Chiang Khong Conservation Group working closely with the locals, the adverse downstream impacts of the scheme are not beneficial but are disastrous and even dangerous.

Drastic River Fluctuations

Fluctuation in water levels has caused immense harm to the river resulting in massive impacts to those whose lives are dependent upon it. Since China implemented the navigation channel improvement project in the 2001 dry season, water fluctuation has been noticeable. The joint committee (JCCCN) announced that regulation of the river flow would be conducive to navigation and project construction from 15 December 2002 to 15 April 2003. Throughout the 2002 and 2003 dry seasons ships were given permission to navigate for one day and then pause for three days to allow for rapid blasting.

During this period, water levels rose and lowered as announced, affecting the entire ecosystem and millions of lives. One thousand kilometers downstream of the Manwan dam, from the northern-most blasting sites to the Thai-Lao border in the northeastern part of Thailand, villagers witnessed strangely drastic water fluctuations.

Additionally, water fluctuation was not limited to the blasting period but was experienced year round. In recent rainy seasons water had not rose as high as in past years. Villagers reported that though it rained heavily for days, the river level was still lower than compared with the normal water level at the same time as in past years. No one can be certain of the water level in the Mekong anymore.

Water Levels harm Fishing

Fisherfolk complained they could not fish in conditions where the river rose to one meter in only a few days and then lowered swiftly. As most fish in the upper reaches of the Mekong are migratory species swimming upstream for reproduction, the fish are dependent on the annual river flow; the fluctuating flow inevitably results in a great decline of fish.

A ‘flagship’ endangered species of the river, the Mekong Giant catfish is at a high risk of extinction. Due to its migratory pattern, the fish swim for great distances from downstream to the upper parts of the Mekong in order to reach the rapids and whirlpools, their spawning ground. Before 1994 and prior to the building of the Chinese dam, around 40 giant catfish were caught annually. The catch numbers gradually fell after the dam started its operation. For the last 3 years, since the rock and rapid blasting project started not a single giant catfish has been caught. Out of the 80 giant catfish fishing boats typically fishing the waters of the Mekong, only a couple tried desperately to catch the fish but they couldn’t find any.

Ecosystem and Economic woes

Not only does the deterioration of the ecosystem mean a decrease in food security for local people, but also economic and social structures are disrupted which are so tightly linked to a healthy ecosystem.

Mekong seaweed, ‘Kai’ as it is called by the Thai and Lao, is the main source of protein for villagers living in the upper reaches of the river. Kai grows on rapids and shallow riverbanks during the dry season when the water is clear and sunlight can reach it. For many local women, Kai is their families’ food security as well as a source of income. Due to the changing water levels, Kai has not grown along the sediment filled Mekong from the Burmese-Lao border to Chaing Khong district in the north.

Dry season vegetables widely grown along the riverbank have been fatally affected as well. Usually when the dry season approaches and water levels decrease, riverbanks and islets come into sight. Locals cultivate their vegetables for household consumption in the lush land fertilized by sediment from the river flow. For many poor families without farmland, products from the riverbank garden are their only source of income and sustenance. However, now these gardens are virtually gone and seem like distant memories. In recent years, villagers throughout Chiang Khong district from Baan Had Bay to Baan Had Saytong lost their farmland because of bank erosion and floods. There are also reports for the same impacts from villagers in the Northeast of Thailand nearly 1,000 kilometers downstream.

“We could get all the vegetables we wanted from the riverbank garden.” said Mr. Boonkong of Pak Ing community. “But it was only the past, now all the land is gone.”

For those whose land still remains, unexpected floods that had never occurred in the dry season before the rapids blasting project, have submerged their seedlings three times during the cultivation period.

Chaotic Ports

Though the navigation project has been planned for a decade by the Chinese, flaws in planning are obvious, especially the social and environmental aspects. Port construction in Thailand is a crystal clear example of poor planning where the government moved forward with rapid development projects that do not consider impacts on the environment and the local people.

In Chiang Khong, ports were rebuilt three times showing an inadequate planning process. The first port was reconstructed at a new site because the former structure was inappropriate given the river flow. The structure was ruined due to the erratic river flows before a year had even passed. The second port included a section that extended 90 meters over the water. The Lao government was so concerned about the obstruction of the waterway they had it destroyed. Additionally, the current remodeled port is still not built to satisfaction especially for the people living in its proximity. It was built upstream of Chiang Khong town directly affecting the town’s water supply system which relies on river water.

Even worse, in Thailand’s Golden Triangle District of Chiang Saen, ports have been constructed and destroyed twice because of their poorly planned structure and location. The port was built in the center of a 700-year-old historical site. Trade-related activities are now invading local ancient sites chasing away the native residents. It is not easy for one who has lived in a quiet town to be suddenly inundated by air-pollution from the 60 cargo trucks that enter the port daily. The small, cozy and calm ancient town of Chiang Saen has been transformed into a medley of disorganized karaoke bars, shops, and warehouses. Moreover, Chinese merchants are taking over businesses that were once owned by local Thai people. Along the riverside road near the port, there is only one shop still locally owned.

No Information Disclosure, Unacceptable EIA

In addition to the harmful and adverse impacts that local people are experiencing, they have had little knowledge and input of the dam project that has affected their lives. Through out project implementation, communities depending on the Mekong have not been informed about development in the river. They are only witnesses to the immense changes, bearing the brunt of the impacts.
At the decision-making level most of the responsible Thai authorities, especially those from environmental agencies had little information on China’s scheme. In many cases officials have no idea of the plans and impacts upstream.

The Free Navigation Agreement signed by China, Burma, Laos, and Thailand allows ships from the four countries to navigate freely on the upper reaches of the Mekong. However the agreement does not specifically cover the navigation improvement project and the blasting of rapids and shoals. After the agreement the Chinese team dynamited rapids and shoals. China claims the project has been implemented according to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that they say meets international standard and complies with environmental laws of the individual countries.

China continues to claim to uphold the high standard of its EIA that was conducted by a Chinese team. However, in April 2003 the Thai cabinet approved a bold resolution to halt the project on the Thai-Lao border until a new EIA is conducted. The decision made by Thailand brings into question the legitimacy of China’s claims.

In another action against the validity of China’s claims, an independent EIA review undertaken by the Monash Environment Institute and sponsored by the Mekong River Commission found, ‘the EIA is unacceptable in many respects. Far too much of the content is based on speculation, the data that is used is patently inadequate, longer-term impacts are almost entirely overlooked, and the cumulative impacts (both social and environmental) are essentially ignored.’

No One Dares to Question China

Until today many of the decision-makers in some riparian countries have not been aware of the project’s impacts on their own population. Although there are those who are aware, none of the riparian governments dare to neither criticize nor raise questions against China. Neither do they take any action to make the project more responsible and comply with the law concerning environmental and social aspects.

Particularly in the case of Thailand, the Free Navigation Agreement signed by the Thai Ministry of Transport and Communication violates the Thai law. The Mekong along the Thai-Lao border is designated as an international wetland. Any development project planned in this area requires an adequate EIA and approval by the cabinet according to Thai environmental law.

Additionally, the Agreement does not directly cover the navigation channel improvement. According to Thai law the Thai Harbor Department is responsible for the free navigation on behalf of the Royal Thai Government and does not have the right to implement the navigation channel improvement project.

Most importantly, the lack of information disclosure and lack of participatory decision-making process violates the 1997 Thailand Constitution, which underscores people’s rights to information, community rights, and rights to participation in development projects.

It is apparent that most Thai government officials know the dam and navigation improvement projects violate the law. However, there is no vocal opposition to these destructive infrastructure projects. Instead, the Thai government bows to China’s pressures and publicizes that Thailand signed the agreement giving support for the blasting.

Regional or Local Issues?

One would think that the Mekong region does not have any governance agreements to address this kind of trans-boundary chaos

While the Mekong River Commission obtained its own agreement authorized by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the two upstream countries Thailand and Laos broke the promise and undertook this fatal project with China and Burma.

It has been clear that this joint project upstream seriously affects downstream residents. In November 2002, village representatives from Chiang Khong had a meeting with Mr. Joern Kristensen, the former CEO of the Mekong River Commission, on impacts from the project. The former CEO insisted that the impacts faced by the locals were only local issues. He affirmed that the first phase of the project would not create any environmental impacts, disregarding the fact that no adequate EIA was done and an independent EIA review carried out for the MRC agreed with this finding. Hence, no one can affirm that such impacts would not be created.

In June 2003, the former CEO of MRC said that China has agreed to carry out only phase one of the project. This raises a question about the position of the MRC and it’s ability to speak out for China, while there has not been any official response on the project publicized by China.

Unstoppable Project?

While the adverse impacts of the projects have been obvious and villagers and NGOs have been trying to demand for a halt to the project until a new EIA is completed, the projects continue to move forward. The last step of the first phase to blast 3 remaining rapids at the Lao-Burmese border on December 15, 2003 may not be stopped. In August 2003, the villagers in Chiang Khong saw a Chinese team conducting a survey to Luang Prabang, Laos.

Voice of the Voiceless

In this time of uncertainty, villagers in northern Thailand have not lost hope. They are trying to voice their concerns to stop the destructive project. Villagers have been demanding information disclosure, genuine EIAs, and people’s participation in decision-making.

While the new EIA for the rapids on the Thai-Lao border has not been implemented, villagers are conducting their own research based on local knowledge of the riverine ecosystem and natural resources. Since this is what they rely on for life, they wish to present how important the River is to them and the voiceless residents hope that the decision-makers may hear their voice.

Growing Concerns in Thailand

Unlike the people living downstream in Thailand, who are able to raise concerns about destructive projects, the people in China who are also affected are not able to voice their opinions and needs. They are the victims who bare the most costs and generally the most marginalized people whose rights have been largely ignored. Lack of civil society in China, Laos and Burma is a growing problem.

From our trip to Yunnan and visits with local villagers impacted by the Manwan dam, we observed the difficultly that villagers have in truly voicing their concerns. What is occurring in those villagers is similar to what occurred in Thailand over the last 3-4 decades. In Thailand, these days it is not easy to build a dam. The growing concern for environmental and social issues has made dams a controversial issue for at least a decade. Thai people are keeping a close watch on Thai dam builders who are expanding to build dams in neighboring countries leading to suffering of local people elsewhere.

Thai people who are consumers of electricity generated from dams in Yunnan would not be happy if they knew the cost paid by the environment and livelihoods of the locals upstream. Still, the information has not been given to the Thai public. It is challenging to publicize the issues and raise the awareness of Thai consumers.

According to the fact that currently there is a 40 percent electricity oversupply in Thailand, it is unnecessary to build dam for such purposes. However, dam builders claim that Thailand will need more energy in the future. However, one should note how many projects Thailand is committing to buy electricity from. In addition, there are many other options for electricity, including demand-side management and renewable resources. If the government recognizes and brings option assessments into policy making, they will see that there is no need for dams.

Two dams on the Lancang, the Jinghong and Nuozhadu, are proposed to supply electricity to Thailand through the ASEAN Power Grid. The question is who will buy the energy when most countries in the region intend to export their electricity including China, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.

These proposed dams would not only put those in China at risk, but also villagers along the Mekong River and Thai consumers.